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II.
A.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY

The State's Standing Argument Fails Under State v. Maxim.
Although it dares not say the words out loud, the state has conceded- as it

must- that Mr. Kaneaster has standing to challenge the search under State v.

Maxim, 165 Idaho 901 (2019). See State's Brief, p. 7, n. 2. Within that footnote, the
state acknowledges that Maxim rejects the standing argument it made below. This
concession should resolve the case, as standing was the only theory raised by the
state below. R 67-69. And standing was the basis upon which the court denied the
motion. T (6/29/2019) p. 11, 1. 8-10. Since Maxim established that Mr. Kaneaster
has standing, the state failed in its burden to establish an exception to the warrant
requirement below and the denial of the Motion to Suppress should be reversed. See

State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 918, 920 (2007) ("[T]he State has the burden of proving
the facts necessary to establish an exception to the warrant requirement.").

B.

Construed as a Consent Argument, the State's Position Still Fails.
l. Maxim requires reversal.

The state attempts to avoid reversal by contending in that same footnote that
its argument was not really about standing but instead is ''best interpreted as an
assertion that the search was reasonable based upon consent[.]" State's Brief,

supra.1 But even considered in its best light, the state's consent theory fails under

1

Better or not, it is not the argument it made below. See R 69 ("Only a person
whose rights are infringed may obtain suppression of evidence. State v. Luna, 126
Idaho 235, 236, 880 P.2d 265 (Ct. 1994). A defendant thus attempting to suppress
1

Maxim.
The Maxim Court held "that a Fourth Amendment waiver cannot salvage an
otherwise unreasonable entry into a home under the Fourth Amendment if the

police officers were unaware of the waiver at the time of the unconstitutional
search." 165 Idaho at 908. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). As
previously noted, the court never found that the officer was aware of the search
waiver, as distinct from his knowledge of Mr. Kaneaster's parole status, at the time
of the search. Nor is there any evidence of such knowledge in the officer's Affidavit
of Probable Cause or in the Preliminary Hearing Transcript. Moreover, the state
never claimed below that the officer was aware of the existence of the search
provision. See R 65-69. (State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress). Thus,
the state failed to meet its burden of proving an exception to the warrant
requirement and the evidence from the vehicle search should have been suppressed.

State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 993 (1992).
2. Mr. Kaneaster is permitted to now argue that the state failed in its
burden of proof based upon Maxim.
The state, after first asserting its standing argument "is best interpreted" as
a consent argument, then has the effrontery to assert - in its very next sentence that Mr. Kaneaster's response to that consent argument has not been preserved for
appeal. It writes:
Kaneaster argues that the state cannot rely on the search condition of parole
to justify Officer Gumeson's search because Officer Gumeson did not know
evidence obtained from a search must first demonstrate standing to challenge the
search. See State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 1159, 162, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000).")
2

about the parole condition when he conducted the search. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 8-12.) Kaneaster waived this argument by failing to assert it in the
district court.
State's Brief p. 10. However, this argument, while possessing chutzpah, not only
violates the maxim of "what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander," but also
lacks factual and legal soundness.
Mr. Kaneaster's position below was that there was a warrantless search and
the evidence obtained through it must be suppressed unless the state could prove
an exception to the warrant requirement. He wrote:
A search or seizure without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it falls
within one of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirement. When a
defendant challenges the validity of a warrantless search, the burden is on
the state to prove that the search was justified. Any evidence obtained in
violation of these constitutional provisions must be suppressed in a criminal
prosecution of the person whose rights were violated.
R 44 (citations to authority omitted). He specifically argued that the parole consent
to search provision did not justify the search under State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho
364 (Ct. App. 2015). R 60-62. He wrote:
Since there was no specific authorization by Probation and Parole, nor any
contact whatsoever between law enforcement and Probation and Parole
regarding Mr. Kaneaster, prior to the search, law enforcement could not be
reasonably considered an agent of Probation and Parole and were therefore
not granted the authority to search the Chevrolet based solely on the waiver
contained within the contact.
R 62. This presented both the issue (warrantless search) and Mr. Kaneaster's
position on the issue (no exception to warrant requirement, including consent) to
the trial court and thus the challenge to consent was properly preserved for appeal.

State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99 (2019). Mr. Kaneaster's consistent position

3

shifted the burden to the state to prove an exception to the warrant requirement.

State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993. In addition, he argued that the search incident
to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply. R 59-62.
In this regard, the state's reliance upon State v. Armstrong, supra, is
misplaced. First, in Armstrong, the state asserted a prima facie case that an
exception to the warrant requirement applied. Id. at 368, n.3. Here, the state never
raised any argument that an exception existed, much less that the parole consent
applied to the case because Officer Gumeson was aware of the waiver at the time of
the unconstitutional search, i.e., the position it takes now. Further, it did not even
allege -- much less establish -- the factual basis for such an argument. Thus, Mr.
Kaneaster was under no obligation to refute an unmade contention. Moreover, the
lack of refutation below does not prevent him from pointing out the state's failure to
prove the Maxim knowledge requirement on appeal because his argument was that
the state could not prove an exception to the warrant requirement including the
consent exception which, as it turns out, it did not.
In addition, the Supreme Court has clarified since Armstrong was decided
when a claim has been preserved for appeal. First, in Ada Cty. Highway Dist. v.

Brooke v'iew, Inc., 162 Idaho 138 (2017), the Court found that an issue had been
adequately preserved for appeal even though the appellant's arguments in support
has changed in some particulars. It wrote:
Here, early in the proceedings before the district court ACHD adopted the
position that damages caused during construction were not recoverable as
part of just compensation. ACHD argued this position repeatedly, despite
being admonished numerous times by the district court to stop doing so.
4

There is no question that ACHD clearly raised the relevant issue before the
district court. ACHD's specific arguments in support of its position may have
evolved since the trial, but the issues on appeal and ACHD's position with
respect to them remain the same.

Id., p. 142 n. 2. Here, Mr. Kaneaster's specific argument that the consent does not
justify the warrantless search because there is no evidence the police were aware of

the consent at the time of the search is not a change in his position that the
warrantless search was not justified by the consent exception to the warrant
requirement. Thus, Brooke v'iewpermits its presentation on appeal.
Mr. Kaneaster's consistent position regarding consent makes this case
distinguishable from State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017) (where
the Court found that the appellant-state could not present an entirely different
exception to the warrant requirement than the one it presented to the district court)
and State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99 (2019) (where the appellant took three
different positions as to when he first became entitled to credit for jail time served
and further "failed to argue or present evidence" on what appeared on appeal to be
the correct position).
Another distinguishing factor is that in all three of the Supreme Court cases
above the appellant bore the burden of proof in the district court proceedings. Here,
however, it was the state who bore the burden of proving an exception to the
warrant requirement. It failed to assert or prove facts sufficient for a prima facie
case for the consent exception and Mr. Kaneaster should not have been required to
respond to an unargued theory. See Armstrong, supra.

5

3. The state's argument that the Maxim rule was satisfied is wrong.
Mr. Kaneaster noted in his motion to suppress that "Officer Gumeson stated"
in his Supplemental Narrative "that he searched the vehicle because both occupants
were on parole and had waived their Fourth Amendment rights." R 62. In doing so,
however, he did not cite to the Supplemental Narrative. Id Instead, he cited to the
Preliminary Hearing Transcript. Id. And what the officer testified to there was: 1)
he "learned that [Mr. Kaneaster] had an IDOC warrant" (PHT p. 5, 1. 23-24) and
that the passenger told the officer "that he was on parole." PHT p. 7, 1. 11-12. In
fact, the officer never testified at the preliminary that he was aware that Mr.
Kaneaster had signed a search waiver. All he knew was that Mr. Kaneaster was on
parole. Thus, while it is possible - indeed likely - that the officer assumed there
was a parole waiver, there is no evidence that he had actual knowledge that one
existed or what the precise terms of that waiver were.
Later, Mr. Kaneaster stipulated to the judicial notice of the Officer's Affidavit
of Probable Cause. T (7/15/2019) p. 17, 1. 20-22. The affidavit states that the officer
was told by dispatch that there was "an IDOC warrant for his arrest" and that he
"learned that both Mr. Garrett and Mr. Kaneaster were on parole." R 13. The state
did not attach the officer's Supplemental Narrative to its Response to Motion to
Suppress. R 61-87. In fact, the state noted that "the facts for [its] statement of the
case [were] taken from testimony given at the preliminary hearing[.]" R 67, n.1.
Thus, its theories could only be based upon the evidence in that document. Again,
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there is no evidence at the preliminary that the officer had actual knowledge that a
waiver existed.
The state argues that it is logical to assume Officer Gumeson was aware of
the waiver. State's Brief, p. 8. But it is more logical to conclude that he did not
have actual knowledge since there was no evidence presented that he contacted Mr.
Kaneaster's parole officer or anyone at the IDOC to inquire prior to his search. He
easily could have done so. As Mr. Kaneaster stated:
And there's a parole hotline -- a 24-hour parole hotline with an on-call parole
agent that Officer Gunderson [sic] could have utilized first to find out if I was
even subject to a parole search because not all parolees are subject to that
and, second, to further verify that I consented to that. He did not even know
that I signed that contract.
T (07/15/2019) p. 12, 1. 10-17. It is equally as likely that the officer was not aware of
the consent provision and was under the mistaken impression that parolees had no
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures merely due to their status as
parolees, rather than by operation of a waiver of those rights. In any case, the
burden was on the state to present evidence in support of its assertion and it failed
to do so.
The absence of evidence is not surprising that the state did not attempt to
prove actual knowledge of the waiver. The argument it made was that Mr.
Kaneaster lacked standing because of the mere existence of the parole waiver. R
69. That theory, however, is inadequate under Maxim. It never argued or
presented evidence that the officer was aware of the waiver at the time of the
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search. Mr. Kaneaster never stipulated to the fact. Thus, the state failed to carry
its burden of proving there was valid consent under Maxim.

C.

The Search Provision is Invalid Because it Exceeded the Scope of the
Authority Given to the Board of Corrections under Art. X, § 5 of the State
Constitution and the Non-Delegation Clause ofArt. II, § 1.
While the state writes this "argument suffers from a fundamental problem"

(State's Brief, p. 8), it is the state's response which is fundamentally flawed. It
argues that State v. Armstrong, held that the "parole search condition 'd[id] not
involve any delegation of decision-making authority whatsoever"' State's Brief, p.9,
quoting Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 369 (emphasis in original). However, the state
omits the following two sentences from that same paragraph of the opinion:
Performing a search is not equivalent to engaging in "the control, direction
and management" of parole and parolees. Although performing parole
searches is a part of that duty, it does not involve any decision-making
authority if done at the request and under the direction of a parole officer.

State v, Armstrong, supra. The search here was conducted without the request of or
under the direction of the IDOC and is distinguishable from Armstrong; compare

also State v. Fenton, 163 Idaho 318, 322 (Ct. App. 2017) (search upheld when
probation officer enlisted the assistance of the officer in searching Fenton's vehicle).
The state argues that the difference between Armstrong and this case "only
hurts [Mr. Kaneaster's] case." That is incorrect. There is no evidence that the
officer was "acting as a police officer investigating a potential drug crime by
conducting a consent-based search after finding on [Mr.] Kaneaster's person a
butane lighter typically used to smoke methamphetamine" as the state claims.
State's Brief, p. 13. The officer testified that he found the lighter and "then
8

searched the vehicle for any drugs, any illegal items." PHT, p. 8, 1. 1-12. He did not
say he searched the vehicle because he suspected drugs were inside. That supposed
motive is pure speculation by the state. Further, the officer's affidavit contradicts
the state's assertion. He swore that: "I learned that both Mr. Garrett and Mr.
Kaneaster were on parole. I found it suspicious that two parolees were out together
at 02:00 in the morning. I asked Mr. Garrett to step out of the vehicle so I could

search it based on both individuals being on parole." R 13 (emphasis added). Thus,
according to the officer, he was not conducting a criminal investigation. He was
engaged in the decision-making authority over the parolees which was delegated to
the Idaho Department of Corrections. Thus, the distinction between this case and

Armstrong is meaningful and favors Mr. Kaneaster's position.
D.

The State Has Not Shown the Error in Denying the Motion to Suppress was
Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
The state makes no attempt to argue that the error was harmless under

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). Consequently, it has not met its burden to do
so.

III.

CONCLUSION

The order Denying the Motion to Suppress should be reversed and the matter
remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 2 nd December, 2020.

/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Appellant
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